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ABSTRACT
Identication of Soft-Error at Gate Level
Ghaith Bany Hamad
Due to shrinking feature size and signicant reduction in noise margins, as
we are moving into very deep sub-micron technology, circuits have become more
susceptible to manufacturing defects, noise-related transient faults and interference
from radiation. Traditionally, soft errors have been a much greater concern in mem-
ories than in logic circuits. However, due to technology scaling, logic circuits have
become equally susceptible to soft errors. Moreover, enhanced usage of commer-
cial o the shelf (COTS) electronic components for avionics has also increased the
importance of analyzing soft errors in hardware circuits. Conventionally, under-
standing soft error glitches requires circuit level modeling, which requires informa-
tion available only at late stages in the design ow. Instead of this approach some
researchers have produced modeling techniques using Reduced Order Binary De-
cision Diagrams (ROBDD) and Algebraic Decision Diagrams (ADD), which does
allow analyzing soft error at an earlier stage in design ow. In this thesis, a new
methodology for modeling soft errors glitch propagation path using Multiway Deci-
sion Graphs is introduced. This modeling technique is applicable on both combina-
tional and asynchronous circuits. The proposed glitch propagation path modeling
technique jointly takes care of logical and electrical masking. Our methodology in-
volves new ways of injecting glitches including glitch injection in feedback paths of
asynchronous circuits. This work presents a complete framework to exhaustively
provide all the possible sequences of signals that lead to the possibility of glitch
propagation to the primary output in combinational and asynchronous circuits. In
addition, a new tool is developed based on the proposed methodology called Soft Er-
ror Glitch-Propagating Path Finder (SEGP-Finder) to automate the identication
iii
of these sequences of signals. This work helps designers identify the vulnerable cir-
cuit paths at the logic abstraction level. Also, this methodology allows designers to
apply radiation tolerance techniques on reduced sets of possibilities. By applying our
methodology on dierent combinational and asynchronous circuits an improvement
in terms of possible-fault injection vectors is observed. As an example, approxi-
mately 8% of all the possible input vectors and sequences is required for obtaining
exhaustive glitch propagation path identication in a representative implementation
of a bundled data asynchronous circuit. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
rst time MDG based decision diagram based soft error identication approach is
proposed for combinational and asynchronous circuits.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It has been an amazing experience to accomplish my Master's thesis in the
Hardware Verication Group (HVG) at Concordia. It certainly would not have
happened without the support and guidance of several people to whom I owe a
great deal.
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Otmane Ait Mohamed.
It is he who oered me the opportunity to join the group. He was fully supportive,
understanding, involved and present during all the phases of my research. I have
learned many things from him in regard to research, academia, and life in general.
Secondly, I sincerely thank Prof. Yvon Savaria, for co-supervising my research
work. Also, I would like to thank Dr. Rafay Hasan, this thesis would not have been
possible without his guidance, his expert advice, his support and encouragements.
He introduced me to the topic of this thesis and guided me in the right direction.
Next, let me thank all the members of HVG for their help and encouragement.
Their friendship brought me a warm environment in the lab. Especially, I thank the
two most helpful people, Naeem Abbasi and Zaid Al Bayati.
Last but not least, I thank my family for their constant moral support and
their prayers. They are the people who are closest to me and suered most for my
higher study abroad. Their support was invaluable in completing this thesis.
v




LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
LIST OF ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Soft Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.1 The Problem in Combinational Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.2 The Problem in Asynchronous Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Thesis Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Preliminaries and Related Work 10
2.1 Soft Error Analysis and Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Asynchronous Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 GP Modeling For Asynchronous Handshake Schemes . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Multiway Decision Graph (MDG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4.1 Abstract State Machine (ASM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4.2 Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.3 The MDG-Tool sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.4 Using MDG for Reachability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.5 Invariant Specication in MDG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3 Identication of Soft-Error Glitch path: Considering Logical Mask-
ing 23
3.1 The Proposed Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2 Glitch Propagation (GP) sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
vii
3.2.1 Muller C-element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2.2 Other Logic Gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 Glitch Injection and Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.4 Invariant Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.5 Soft Error Analysis on Combinational circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.6 Soft Error Analysis on Asynchronous Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.6.1 Delay Insensitive (DI) Asynchronous Circuit . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.6.2 Bundled Data Protocol based Asynchronous Circuit . . . . . . 33
3.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4 Identication of Soft Error Glitch Propagation Path: Considering
Electrical and Logical Masking 37
4.1 Electrical Masking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.2 Assumptions and Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.3 Modeling Electrical and Logical masking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.4 The Proposed Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5 SEGP-Finder : Automating Identication of Soft Error Glitch-
Propagating Paths(SEGP) 48
5.1 Identication of Soft-Error at Gate-Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.2 SEGP-Finder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.3 Annotate the MDG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.4 MDG Invocation and Result Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.5 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.5.1 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.5.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
viii




1.1 SET eects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 A popular representation of combinational circuits. . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Critical charge for SRAM/latch/logic [8]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Illustrates synchronous and asynchronous feedback. . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 GP sets for NOT, AND, OR, and Muller C-element [49]. . . . . . . . 14
2.2 BBDs to MDGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 The Structure of the MDGs-tool. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Invariant specication in MDG tool. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1 The ow chart of the proposed technique. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2 C17 with the glitch injected between G2 and G3. . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3 One of the counterexamples for the C17. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.4 MDG decision diagram for path G1  ! G5 from circuit C17. . . . . . 30
3.5 Hardware implementation of the data-encoded DI scheme. . . . . . . 32
3.6 Asynchronous Delay Insensitive (DI) circuit after the implementation 33
3.7 Asynchronous Bundle Data circuit without the initialization technique. 35
3.8 Asynchronous Bundle Data circuit with the initialization technique. . 35
4.1 Glitch propagation with electrical masking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.2 A glitch at the (a) output of initial gate G1, (b) output of gate G2,
(c) output of gate G3 on sensitized path. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.3 Multiway Decision Graph. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.4 The ow chart for the proposed methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.1 The ow chart of the SEGP-Finder. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.2 The annotator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
x
5.3 C17 with the glitch injected between G1and G5. . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.4 User Transparent MDG Invocation and Result Analysis. . . . . . . . 53
5.5 C17 with the glitch injected between G1 and G5. . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.6 One of the counterexamples for the C17. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.7 Gate-Level representation of 4-bit adder circuit. . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.8 Self-timed multiple-group pipeline [48] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.9 3-of-6 completion detection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.10 4-bit adder circuit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.11 4-bit multiplier circuit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
xi
LIST OF TABLES
2.1 Summary of AL and VL notations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1 The truth table for the C-element. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2 Truth table for the AND, OR, and NOT gates. . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 Node wise Vulnerable Conditions for C17. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1 The truth table for AND gate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2 The truth table for OR gate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.1 Node wise vulnerable conditions for C17. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.2 Node wise vulnerable conditions for 4-Bit adder circuit. . . . . . . . . 56
5.3 The initial sequences for the DI circuit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.4 Node wise vulnerable conditions for DI asynchronous circuit. . . . . . 58
5.5 Node wise vulnerable conditions for the self-timed multiple-group
pipeline circuit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.6 The result when a glitch the glitch inserted at the output of N1. . . . 60
5.7 Node wise vulnerable conditions for 4-Bit adder circuit. . . . . . . . . 64
5.8 Identiable vulnerable input sequences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
xii
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADD Algebraic Decision Diagram
AQX Aected by aggressor-to-Quiet-line crosstalk
ASM Abstract State Machine
BDD Binary Decision Diagram
BD Bundle Data
DAG Directed Acyclic Graph
DI Delay Insensitive
FOL First Order Logic
GALS Globally Asynchronous Locally Synchronous
ITRS International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors
MDG Multiway Decision Graph
ROBDD Reduced Order Binary Decision Diagram
SEE Single Event Eects
SET Single Event Transit
SEU Single Event Upset
SER Soft Error Rate




Digital designs have been growing fast in size and complexity over the past four
decades. As this complexity grows, reliability is becoming an increasingly major
concern for designers especially for mission critical systems such as avionic, medical
and banking applications. Fault tolerant design methods have been gaining increased
importance to provide more reliable designs. To allow the ecient design of a system
that can tolerate faults, a rst natural step includes understanding the source of
induced errors, and most importantly, their analysis and modeling for the purpose
of guiding the design process.
A fault is an incorrect logic behavior that result from some physical defect,
imperfection, or aw in the hardware or software part of the system. According to
their source or duration, faults classied as permanent, transient or intermittent.
Reliability issues in modern deep sub-micron technologies have aggravated because
designs implemented with scaled technologies have become more venerable to dis-
turbances induced by crosstalk and soft-errors. Therefore, there is a growing need
for understanding the eect of soft errors in digital design at an early stage in the
design ow. This work is an attempt in this direction.
1
1.1 Soft Error
Soft errors can be dened as circuit errors caused due to excess charge carriers
induced primarily by external radiation, e.g., cosmic rays or alpha particles. If these
radiation events cause a charge generation large enough to perturb the logic value
on the output of a gate, a single-event transient (SET) is generated. If a SET is
propagated and latched into a memory element then it is called single event upset
(SEU).
Soft errors typically aect logic circuits in various ways. These faults can cause
an error in the system by changing the internal state, even though they last only
for a short time. The rate at which the soft error occurs is called Soft Error Rate
(SER). It is usually measured in FIT (Failure In Time), which is the number of
failures per 109 device hours. Researchers have shown that SER in logic is posing a
threat now [57] and will increase in occurrences rate by orders of magnitude within
the next few years [39]. As the technology is shrinking the possibility of occurrence
of soft errors in combinational circuit is getting as high as the possibility in SRAMs
[2].
It is well known that alpha particles cause soft errors. Dierent techniques
have been proposed to reduce the soft error rate due to alpha particles such as:
reducing the number of alpha particles emitted by the package; coating the chip
surface with a lm that blocks alpha particle irradiation; and better design of the
memory device to make it less sensitive to alpha-induced soft errors. However, even
when reducing or attempting to eliminate alpha particle, soft errors are still there.
Recently, it has been found that cosmic ray neutrons also cause soft errors even at
ground level [43]. Approximately 95% of the particles capable of causing soft errors
are energetic neutrons [56]. Neutrons are uncharged and cannot disturb a circuit
on their own, but the notably undergo neutron capture by the nucleus of atoms in
a chip. This process may result in the production of charged secondaries, such as













Figure 1.1: SET eects.
Figure 1.1 reports an example of SET: the circuit is primary inputs are set to
0; thus the expected output value is 0 on both G4 and G5 outputs. When G3 is
struck by a particle with sucient energy, its output switches to 1, for a duration
long enough so that it may propagate through to the primary outputs. As a result,
we observe a transition on both G4 and G5, whose outputs are set to 1. As soon as
the SET eects disappear, the outputs switch back to the expected value.
In combinational logic there are three masking eects (logical, electrical and
latching-window masking) that prevent the soft fault glitch from causing an error.
Modeling soft faults in combinational logic is always combined with modeling these
three masking eects. In the following section we discuss in more detail the im-
portance of modeling and detecting soft errors in combinational and asynchronous
circuits and the main challenges facing modeling the soft error in these circuits.
1.2 Problem Formulation
1.2.1 The Problem in Combinational Circuits
A digital circuit is dened as combinational if its steady-state output is completely
determined by the present inputs as shown in Figure 1.2. A combinational circuit
consists of input variables, logic gates and output variables. The logic gates accept
signals from the inputs and generate signals to the outputs. This process transforms
3
binary information from the given input data to a required output data. Combina-
tional circuits are employed extensively in the design of digital systems. Most digital
systems are made up of standard combinational blocks, such as adders, multipliers,
decoders etc. They perform specic digital functions commonly needed in the de-
sign of digital systems. Some combinational circuits, such as decoders, encoders and
multiplexers, can be used to control other devices such as decoder circuits [15, 16],
three-state buers [17], register circuits [17], bus circuits, read / write memory op-
erations [18] and others. Decoder and other combinational circuits can be used in
mobile system, wireless networks and can be applied for other related communica-
tion systems [19, 20]. Decoder logic is essential for control units and memories [21].
N-inputs M-outputs
Figure 1.2: A popular representation of combinational circuits.
Traditionally, soft errors have been of greater concern in memories than in
logic circuits, because of the small cell size of memories. In contrast to this, three
factors prevented logic from becoming more susceptible to soft errors:
1. Logical masking - to be latched, a SET needs to be on the sensitized path
from the location where it originates to the latch;
2. Electrical masking - a SET needs to create a pulse that has a duration and
amplitude large enough to reach the latches. Due to the electrical properties
of the gates the pulse (glitch) passes through, it can be attenuated and even
completely masked before it reaches the latch.
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3. Latching-window masking- if the pulse reaches the latch and appears at its
input "on time", depending on its amplitude and duration, it can be latched.
 
Figure 1.3: Critical charge for SRAM/latch/logic [8].
However, as technology continues to scale, logic circuits are becoming much
more susceptible to soft errors [8] as shown in Figure 1.3. This gure shows a
decreasing trend in QCRIT . Where QCRIT is dened as the minimum amount of
induced charge required at a circuit node to cause a voltage pulse to propagate from
that node to the output and be of sucient duration and magnitude to be reliably
latched. A higher QCRIT means fewer soft errors. Smaller feature sizes and lower
voltage levels allow lower energy particles to cause SETs. Figure 1.3 shows this
trend, where QCRIT of logic circuits continues to reduce with scaling in technology.
Hence the logic circuits in sub-100 nm era have become vulnerable to soft errors
even at terrestrial altitudes [38]. Therefore, soft error failure rates in combinational
logic are expected to become very important in the future and it may even exceed
soft error rates in memories [22].
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1.2.2 The Problem in Asynchronous Circuits
A combinational circuit does not store any data for the future time. In actual
implementation, these circuits contain logic gates without feedback signals. An
asynchronous circuit, on the other hand, has combinational feedback which can store
signal states. Its output, therefore, depends on both primary inputs and internal
states. The internal states, in turn, may depend upon previous primary inputs.
Asynchronous circuits are becoming more prevalent. Most commonly they
occur in the interfaces and the glue logic that binds the components of a system.
According to ITRS 2009, 25% of the global signals in integrated circuits will be
asynchronous handshakes by 2015 [5]. Asynchronous logic is adaptable to delay
variations and components designed to function asynchronously can be more easily
composed. Some of the often mentioned advantages of asynchronous circuits are
speed, low energy dissipation, modular design, immunity to metastable behavior,
freedom from clock skew, and low susceptibility to electromagnetic interference [23].
Figure 1.4 shows the dierence between asynchronous and synchronous feedback. In
synchronous circuits:
 Synchronous feedback must wait for the clock.
 Always behaves as described in its state table.
 Input signals must not change when the clock does.







Figure 1.4: Illustrates synchronous and asynchronous feedback.
6
While in asynchronous circuits:
 Asynchronous feedback comes immediately with only gate delays.
 Inputs can come at any time.
 Circuits may not behave as described in the state table.
The design, verication, and testing of asynchronous circuits are complex prob-
lems. When modeling asynchronous circuits, certain requirements have to be taken
into consideration due to the special nature of those circuits. These requirements
are:
1. The initial values of inputs are governed by the relevant asynchronous proto-
cols.
2. Asynchronous circuits have feedback paths from the outputs to the inputs.
In the verication or the simulation of asynchronous circuits, the conditions
imposed by the protocol on these paths must be considered.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
In most of the previous work, electrical masking is analyzed through simulation [2],
while logical masking is analyzed by path tracing [1, 2, 3]. In comparison to [1, 2,
3, 4], where latching-window, electrical and logical masking are analyzed separately
and assumed independent, our approach provides a unied treatment of electrical
and logical masking, while including their joint dependency on input patterns and
circuit topology.
In our work, by using Multiway Decision Graphs (MDGs), this information
is instead implicitly included inside the decision diagram, and therefore allows for
ecient concurrent computation of output error susceptibility caused by hits on
various internal nodes.
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In this work, we propose a new way to verify the glitch propagation by per-
forming invariant checking. This checking includes running reachability analysis and
checking the glitch propagation at each reachable state.
Because asynchronous circuits are becoming increasingly common due to their
introduction as an interfacing mechanism in cross clock domain communication, it
is extremely valuable to develop a technique that deals with modeling soft error
glitch propagation in asynchronous circuits at a higher abstraction level. In terms
of reviews of related work, proposed methodology and discussions, we believe our
contribution can be specied as:
 Initially this thesis proposes a new methodology to identify the eect of logical
masking of soft-faults and glitch propagation in both combinational and asyn-
chronous circuits using MDG. As yet, such techniques have not been explored
for soft error modeling or for analysis of glitch propagation in asynchronous
circuits.
 This work elaborated on a way around to keep the functionality of the asyn-
chronous systems while injecting glitches in feedback paths of asynchronous
circuits.
 This work provides a complete framework for modeling soft faults and glitch
propagation as well as a methodology to introduce them into asynchronous
and combinational circuits.
 We extended the proposed methodology to jointly capture the eects of both
electrical and logical masking of the Soft-Error glitch propagation for asyn-
chronous and combinational circuits.
 A new tool is developed to automate the proposed methodologies called soft
error glitch propagation nder (SEGP-Finder).
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1.4 Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
 In Chapter 2, we present some of the related works in the areas of Soft-Error,
the structure of Multiway Decision Graph (MDG), the MDG tool followed by
the MDG model checking approach and asynchronous circuits and its impor-
tance in modern deep sub-micron technologies.
 In Chapter 3, we discuss our proposed methodology for the identication of
soft-error glitches in both combinational and asynchronous circuits and provide
step by step description of the methodology. In this chapter, the methodology
considers only logical masking.
 In Chapter 4, we discuss our proposed methodology for modeling the eect of
both electrical and logical masking in combinational and asynchronous circuits.
 In Chapter 5, we explain the automation of the proposed methodology and
the mechanics of the tool SEGP-Finder. This chapter also contain the exper-
imental results showing the validation of our approach.
 We conclude the thesis by summarizing our work. Also we provide some future
research directions in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries and Related Work
In this chapter, we provide some background information necessary to understand
the remaining chapters along with some related works. We start by providing some
related research work in modeling soft errors. We then describe the underlying
formal logic of MDG, the Abstract State Machine (ASM) and the MDG structure.
Finally, we provide an introduction to the MDG tool, the MDG model checker, and
the invariant specications.
2.1 Soft Error Analysis and Modeling
Faulty systems (buggy in digital systems) can be very dangerous and very expensive;
especially system that have safety critical applications such as Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (MRI) machines, space shuttles, microprocessors and so on. This increases
the need for fault diagnosis and fault-tolerance-driven design methodologies [9].
Due to this need, a lot of research work has been done on analyzing and
modeling the eect of soft-errors [3, 32-35]. One of the earliest approaches was to
inject the fault at a certain internal node of the design and then run simulate the
circuit for dierent input sequences.
In most of the previous work, modeling the electrical and logical masking is
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done separately such as [2, 31]. In [2], the analysis of electrical masking for each
path is performed within HSPICE simulator, and logical masking is analyzed for
each input vector and each path separately, by ipping the logic value of each node.
Using a mathematical model in order to analyze the propagation of a transient
fault through a chain of combinational gates has been proposed in [31]. Their work
was focused on estimating electrical masking on the sensitized path in the circuit,
while logical and latching-window masking were not included.
In [36], an independent computation of the soft error masking factors; logical,
electrical, and latching-window masking to nd the soft-error tolerance of the circuit
is proposed. Some other works focused on modeling only one of the masking eects
such as in [37] where the focus is only on modeling the logical masking eect of
the circuit for given gate output probabilities, without considering electrical and
latching window masking.
In [10], the authors addressed the topic dierently by proposing a modeling
technique using Reduced Order Binary Decision Diagram (ROBDD) and Algebraic
Decision Diagram (ADD), and combining the eects of logical, electrical and time
masking. ADD is used for glitch modeling and Binary Decision Diagram (BDD)
checks for the sensitization path. However, ROBDD suers from state space explo-
sion. Also this technique uses two decision diagrams, due to the limited availability
of data types, to elaborate the glitch scenario.
In [30], a soft error modeling tool, FASER, is introduced that uses a modied
BDD called event BDD to analyze glitch propagation. Since BDDs based techniques
suer from state space explosion problem, FASER [30] tries to resolve this issue




In this work, we use the term "Asynchronous" to refer to circuits designed without
clocks, also known as Self-Timed circuits, where the clock is replaced by handshak-
ing signals. Asynchronous interface circuits are indispensable in many real-time
digital systems [7, 41]. It is used to describe a variety of design styles, which use
dierent assumptions about circuit properties. Two commonly used protocols in
asynchronous circuit are:
 Bundled data protocol [9, 10, 11], which uses 'conventional' data processing
elements with completion indicated by a locally generated delay model.
 Delay-insensitive (DI) data-encoded protocol [8, 12, 13, 45], where arbitrary
delays through circuit elements can be accommodated. The latter style tends
to yield circuits which are larger than bundled data implementations, but
which are insensitive to layout and parametric variations and are thus "correct
by design".
In order to verify the behavior of this kind of asynchronous circuits, un-
derstanding the protocol the asynchronous circuit is following is very important.
Then the design can be veried under certain condition based on the used proto-
col. The next chapter discusses the implementation of our proposed technique on
asynchronous circuits in more details.
These asynchronous circuits have unbounded gate delay assumption, which
provides them with inherent tolerance to a broad class of delay faults. However,
in certain cases, faults occurring in asynchronous circuits can have catastrophic
eects due to the event ordering constraints and might cause circuit failure and can
sometimes lead to deadlock [46].
The authors in [53, 54] proposed a metric, sensitive time, to evaluate the sen-
sitivity of asynchronous circuits to transient faults and developed several harderning
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techniques for Quasi delay insensitive (QDI) circuits with full duplication of circuit
parts and synchronization of replicated results through C-elements [55].
The problem of soft errors in asynchronous burst-mode machines (ABMMs)
has been discussed in [44], and two solutions have been proposed. The rst solution
is an error tolerance approach, which leverages the inherent functionality of Muller
C-elements, along with a variant of duplication, to suppress all transient errors. The
second solution is an error mitigation approach, which leverages a newly devised soft-
error susceptibility assessment method for ABMMs, along with partial duplication,
to suppress a carefully chosen subset of transient errors.
Control circuits in an asynchronous design are comprised mostly of Muller
C-elements. In [47], soft error analysis of four popular CMOS implementations of
the Muller C-element have been presented. The analysis shows that Safety Integrity
Level (SIL) implementation has the best soft error resilience. Optimization tech-
niques to improve the soft error resilience of C-elements are proposed in [47].
2.3 GP Modeling For Asynchronous Handshake
Schemes
The GP set is the set of conditions that allows a glitch to propagate, in dierent
logic gates and Muller C-elements [28]. Figure 2.1 shows the GP sets for the NOT,
AND, OR, and Muller C-elements. Using the GP sets in modeling glitches is initially
proposed for modeling crosstalk glitch in asynchronous circuits which is the work
done in [49]. In the following we explain this work to better understand of the theory
behind the GP sets. In the next chapter, we explain how the GP sets can be used
to model the soft error glitch as well.
In the related modeling framework, an aggressor line (AL) is a signal line which
performs a transition from logic level logic 0 to logic 1 (or logic 1 to logic 0), denoted
by T (or T'). T inicts a crosstalk glitch G (G') on the victim line (VL). Glitch on
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Figure 2.1: GP sets for NOT, AND, OR, and Muller C-element [49].
a particular VL, for example A, due to T (T') in AL is represented as GA(GA). VL
returns to its stable state after a bounded delay,4tG. In the context of asynchronous
handshake schemes in globally asynchronous locally synchronous (GALS) aected
by aggressor-to-quiet-line crosstalk (AQX), VL can glitch (i.e., G or G') only if VL
and AL are at the same logic level before T (T'). Typically, channels linking two
mutually asynchronous communicating modules are vulnerable to AQX because of
the physical length of the required interconnections.
AL in (VL in) and AL out (VL out), respectively, denote whether the AL
(VL) signal is an inbound or outbound signal to the module. AL I (VL I) and
AL O (VL O) represent the corresponding input and output signals which are tran-
siting (glitching) toward T (G), respectively. Opposite transitions (glitches) are
represented as their complements (AL I', AL O', VL I', VL O'). This notation is
summarized in Table 2.1.
DG (DG') is a symbol used in our modeling method to represent composite logic
values of the form v/vg, where v and vg are values of the same signal in the glitch-free
and the erroneous circuit, respectively. The composite logic values that represent
possible error propagation 1/G' and 0/G are denoted by the symbols DG and DG',
respectively. The terminology was adopted as an extension of that used in the
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Table 2.1: Summary of AL and VL notations.
Wire Direction of the Logic Level '1'
Name signal on the wire on the signal wire
Aggressor AL AL in, AL out AL I, AL O
Victim VL VL in, VL out VL I, VL O
D-algorithm [50, 51] at the foundation of testing methodologies.
In this work, we use the GP sets to model the soft error glitch. There are
some dierences between soft error and crosstalk glitch. While crosstalk glitch can
occur at the primary input, soft error glitch only happens at the internal, and if that
internal node is primary input for combinational circuits then it can occur at the
primary input. Also, G, G' is reactive to T, T' in crosstalk glitch modeling, while
G, G' can occur irrespective of T, T' in soft error. In the next chapter, we discuss
modeling soft error glitch using GP sets in detail.
2.4 Multiway Decision Graph (MDG)
2.4.1 Abstract State Machine (ASM)
MDG is an extension of Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) in the sense that it repre-
sents and manipulates a subset of rst-order logic formulae suitable for large data
path circuits. One of the advantages of MDG over the other decision graph is that
a data value can be represented by a single variable of abstract sort, rather than
by concrete Boolean variables, and a data operation can be represented by an un-
interpreted function symbol. MDG and ROBDD are alike in the sense that both
require a xed order of node labels along all paths. In ROBDD the entire variable
are Boolean. But in MDG every signal/variable must belong to an appropriate sort,
also a type denition must be provided for all functions. The MDG operations and
verication procedures are packaged as a set of tools and implemented in prolog
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[14] providing facilities for hardware verication: invariant checking, equivalence
checking and model checking. This work utilizes MDG to identify soft error glitch
propagation in asynchronous handshakes, which are extensively used for communi-
cation among CDC modules.
In MDG, a state machine is described using nite sets of input, state and
output variables, which are pair-wise disjoint. The behavior of a state machine is
dened by its transition/output relations including a set of reset states. An abstract
description of the state machine, called Abstract State Machine [24], is obtained by
letting some data input, state or output variables be of an abstract sort, and the
datapath operations be uninterpreted function symbols. As ROBDDs are used to
represent sets of states and transition/output relations for nite state machines
(FSM), MDGs are used to compactly encode sets of (abstract) states and transi-
tion/output relations for ASMs. This technique replaces the implicit enumeration
technique [25] with the implicit abstract enumeration [11].
2.4.2 Structure
MDGs are graph representation of a class of quantier-free and negation-free rst
order many sorted formulae. It subsumes the class of Bryant's (ROBDDs) [6] while
accommodating abstract data and Uninterpreted Function symbols. MDG can be
seen as a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) with one root, whose leaves are labeled by
formulae of the logic True (T) [11], such that:
1. Every leaf node is labeled by the formula T, except if the graph G has a single
node, which may be labeled T or F.
2. The internal nodes are labeled by terms, and the edges issuing from an internal
node v are labeled by terms of the same sort as the label of v.
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Following is an example: Let graph G represent Boolean formula (:x^F0)_
(x^F1) Where, F0 and F1 are the Boolean formulas represented by the sub-graphs
G0 and G1 respectively. In many sorted rst-order logic the graph G can be viewed
as representing a formula: ((x = 0) ^ F0) _ (x = 1) ^ F1)):
Three possible generalizations of G and the corresponding formulas are shown
in Figure 2.2. F0, F1 and F2 are rst-order formulas represented by the sub-graphs
G0, G1 and G2 respectively:
1. From G to G0: x 2 f0; 1g  ! x 2 f0; 2; 3g, and graph G0 represents the
formula
((x = 0) ^ F0) _ ((x = 2) ^ F1) _ ((x = 3) ^ F2):
2. From G to G00: x 2 f0; 1g  ! x 2 fa; y; f(a; y)g, and graph G00 represents the
formula
((x = a) ^ F0) _ ((x = y) ^ F1) _ ((x = f(a; y)) ^ F2):
3. From G to G000: x 2 f0; 1g  ! g(x) 2 f0; 2; 3g, and graph G000 represents the
formula
((g(x) = 0) ^ F0) _ ((g(x) = 2) ^ F1) _ ((g(x) = 3) ^ F2):
The above generalized decision graph G0, G00 and G000 are examples ofMultiway
Decision Graphs (MDGs). As in ordinary many-sorted First Order Logic (FOL),
terms are made out of sorts, constants, variables, and function symbols. Two kinds of
sorts are distinguished: concrete and abstract. Concrete sort is equipped with nite
enumerations, lists of individual constants. Concrete sorts are used to represent
control signals. Abstract sort has no enumeration available. A signal of an abstract
sort represents a data signal.
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Figure 2.2: BBDs to MDGs
2.4.3 The MDG-Tool sets
The MDG-tool [14] is a well known academic tool. It supports invariant checking,
sequential equivalence checking, and model checking. The MDG tool uses a prolog-
style hardware description language called the MDG-HDL [11]. MDG-HDL supports
structural, behavioral and mixed styles of coding. A structural specication is usu-
ally a netlist of components connected by signals. A behavioral description consists
of a tabular representation of the transition and output relations in the form of a
truth table.
The rst step in the verication is to describe the design specications and
implementations using MDG-HDL, as shown in Figure 2.3. The following input les
















Figure 2.3: The Structure of the MDGs-tool.
 The algebraic specication le denes sorts, function types and generic con-
stants used in hardware descriptions. And if necessary, it also includes the
rewrite rules which partially interpret the otherwise uninterpreted function
symbols.
 The symbol order le provides the custom (user-dened) symbol order for all
the variables and cross-operators which would appear in MDGs.
 The circuit description le declares signals and their sort assignments, com-
ponent network, outputs and the mapping between state variables and next
state variables. There is a special component construct table which is the tab-
ular representation for behavioral descriptions. For sequential circuits, we also
give the set of initial states and the transition/output relation partitioning
strategy.
 The invariant specication le denes the invariant to be checked during the
reachability analysis.
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2.4.4 Using MDG for Reachability Analysis
The presence of uninterpreted symbols in the logic means that we must distinguish
between a state machineM and its abstract description D in the logic. This is called
Abstract State Machine, a state machine given an abstract description in terms of
Directed Formulas DFs, or equivalently MDGs, as dened in [11, 58].
Denition 1. An abstract description of a state machine M is a tuple
D = (X; Y; Z; Y 0; IS; Tr;Or); where:
 X : nite set of input variables,
 Y : nite set of state variables,
 Z : nite set of output variables,
 IS : MDG of type U0  ! Y , where U0 is a set of disjoint abstract variables,
IS is the abstract description of the set of initial states,
 Tr : MDG of type X [ Y  ! Y 0. Tr is the abstract description of the
transition relation,
 Or : MDG of type X [ Y  ! Z. Or is the abstract description of the output
relation.
Algorithm 1 shows how the analysis of the reachable states of M is performed
based on the abstract description D. The algorithm is initialized by the construction
of the initial MDG structure in Lines 1-3. In line 4-10, within the while loop, the
set of reachable states is computed. When the frontier set (Q) becomes empty (F),
the while loop terminates. A new MDG input is produced in line 6. In line 7,
next state is computed by the function next state using the RelP operation, that
takes the MDGs representing the set of inputs, the current state and the transition
relation as assignment, respectively. In line 8, The function frontier, computes
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the set dierence using the PbyS operation, that approximates the set dierence
between the newly reachable state in the current iteration from the reachable state
in the rst iteration. Finally, the set of all reachable states so far is computed, in
line 9.
Algorithm 1 MDG Reachability Analysis
1: R := IS;
2: Q := IS;
3: i := 0;
4: while Q 6= F do do
5: i := i+ 1;
6: IN := new inputs(i); -Produce new inputs
7: NS := next states(IN,Q, Tr); Compute next state
8: Q := frontier(NS,R); Set dierence
9: R := union(R,Q); Merge with set of states reached previously
10: end while
2.4.5 Invariant Specication in MDG
An invariant le species the invariant condition to be checked during reachability
analysis [27]. An invariant condition can be specied by a combinational circuit
whose output signals are named by the variables that occur in the condition. By
convention, an assignment of values to those variables satises the condition i
the outputs of the combinational circuit take those values for some assignment of
values to the inputs. An MDG representing the invariant is obtained from the
MDG representing the functionality of the combinational circuit by existentially
quantifying the concrete inputs. The variables representing abstract inputs are left
in the graph as implicitly quantied secondary variables [26].
For example, for the equivalence checking of two ASMs, we need to specify
the equality of two corresponding signals as an invariant. This is expressed by
the simple fork as shown in Figure 2.4 (a). The fork may yield dierent MDGs
depending on the sort of the signals. If u, x and y are of the Boolean sort, then
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u is existentially quantied and we get the MDG as shown in Figure 2.4 (b) which
simply represents x = y. If x and y are of an abstract sort, then we get an MDG
as shown in Figure 2.4 (c) which represents the formula (x = u) ^ (y = u). Taking
the secondary variable u to be existentially quantied, the invariant is 9u((x =
u) ^ (y = u)), which is logically equivalent to x = y. This combinational circuit
is described completely in an invariant specication le, including the following
predicates: signal/2, component/2, outputs/1 and ordercond/1, which gives the















Figure 2.4: Invariant specication in MDG tool.
In this Chapter, we presented some of the basics required for better under-
standing the rest of chapters of this thesis. We provided the basics of Multiway
Decision Graph, MDG tool, GP sets, and asynchronous circuits. We have presented
some of the works related to soft error modeling in combinational and asynchronous
circuits. Furthermore, we also mentioned how our work diers from the related
work. In the next chapter, we describe our proposed methodology in detail.
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Chapter 3
Identication of Soft-Error Glitch
path: Considering Logical
Masking
In this chapter, we present the proposed methodology for the identication of soft-
errors in both combinational and asynchronous circuits. In this chapter, we deal with
the identication of soft error and modeling logical masking in logic circuits. Logical
masking has been explained in chapter 1. In section 3.1, we explain the main steps of
the proposed methodology. Section 3.2 discusses how we use the Glitch Propagation
(GP) sets to identify the soft error glitch and to model the logical masking eect.
We explain the new proposed technique for glitch injection at vulnerable nodes, also
the breaking and the initializing of the feedback in asynchronous circuits in Section
3.3. Section 3.4, explains how the invariant checking is used to verify the glitch
propagation property. The implementation of our approach on combinational logic
and asynchronous circuits is discussed in detail in section 3.5 and 3.6 respectively.
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3.1 The Proposed Methodology
This section presents an overview of the proposed technique; the ow chart of our
methodology is shown in Figure 3.1. This gure shows that our methodology re-
quires structural specications as input. The next step is to inject a glitch at the
vulnerable nodes by modifying these structural specications. The following step is
to examine the possibility of glitch propagation using formal verication techniques.
This methodology provides the number of nodes that are prone to glitches and gen-
erates counterexamples. These examples are the vulnerable conditions under which












Structural specification of the digital 
system







Figure 3.1: The ow chart of the proposed technique.
24
3.2 Glitch Propagation (GP) sets
In section 2.3, we dened the GP set as a set of conditions that allow glitches to
propagate in dierent logic gates and Muller C-element. Also we discussed how
the GP sets used to model the crosstalk glitch in asynchronous circuits. The next
subsections explain how we combine the GP sets with the soft-error glitch in order
to build a new truth table for dierent logic gates and and Muller C-element.
3.2.1 Muller C-element
Table 3.1 shows the expansion of the GP sets in the form of a truth table. Each
GP set's truth table has four possible values 0; 1; G;G0. If the glitch is from logic
0 towards logic 1 then it is represented as G and G0 represents the inverse case.
Composite value, DG represents that an un-aected node would have the value
010 while the glitch will force this node to glitch, G0. Hence, DG represents 1=G0.
Similar explanation elaborates DG0, which represents 0=G. Table 3.1 shows that if
the output of the C-element is logic 010 before the occurrence of a composite logic
value of DG in any or both inputs of the C-element, then, due to the glitch, the
output of the C-element will have a composite logic value of DG after the gate
propagation delay at time t+.
Table 3.1: The truth table for the C-element.
C-element
0 1 G G'
t- t+ t- t+ t- t+ t- t+
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 DG
1
0 0 0 1 0 DG' 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G
0 0 0 DG' 0 NTS 0 NTS
1 1 1 1 1 NTS 1 NTS
G` 0 0 0 0 0 NTS 0 NTS
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3.2.2 Other Logic Gates
For all the logic gates (such as: AND, OR, NOT, NAND, XOR etc.) we apply the
same principle used in the previous section. For example, for the AND gate if one
of the inputs is zero then the output is zero without caring about the other inputs.
So the glitch can not propagate from the AND gate if one of the other inputs is
zero. We similarly expanded all the GP sets provided in [12] for all the logic gates
and came up with similar truth tables, which are shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Truth table for the AND, OR, and NOT gates.
0 1 DG DG`
AND OR AND OR AND OR AND OR NOT
0 0 0 0 1 0 DG 0 DG' 1
1 0 1 1 1 DG 1 DG' 1 0
DG 0 DG DG 1 DG DG DG' DG DG
DG' 0 DG' DG' 1 1 DG' DG DG' DG'
3.3 Glitch Injection and Initialization
In order to insert glitches, we rst need to translate the structural specication into
an MDG model. The MDG model contains declaration of the signals and their type
assignments, the component network, the outputs, and the mapping between state
variables and next state variables. In this work, we used an MDG based table, which
is the tabular representation for behavioral descriptions. Glitches are inserted using
the library of GP sets, which is created a priori. This library contains the GP sets in
the form of truth tables, with the logic values introduced in Table 3.1 and 3.2. We
modeled those truth tables in MDG while keeping the information provided in the
structural specications. This method can be easily ported to any combinational
logic circuit.
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To inject glitches at all the possible nodes in a design, we used multiplexers,
which can select between a normal mode and a glitch mode during the simulation.
If a soft error needs to be analyzed at a particular node, it simply chooses the
glitch mode (dened as an enumerated data type), otherwise the normal operation
is carried out. Hence, the functionality of the circuit is preserved under the normal
mode. After building the MDG model and injecting the glitch, the next step is to
nd if the glitch is able to propagate to the primary outputs.
3.4 Invariant Checking
To write an invariant, one needs to know the semantics of MDG-HDL. Since this
language was devised for sequential circuits, therefore, it includes the notion of
register at the end of the design. In our modeling of asynchronous circuits, these
registers always appear at the output of the design and hence do not disturb the
logic of the circuit. This also helps writing the invariant to check whether the glitch
can propagate to the primary output of the circuit or not. This can be written
in temporal logic as AG((reg out = 0)jj(reg out = 1)), which means "In all the
reachable states, the output of the register is equal to 1 or 0". We can apply the same
invariant to all the asynchronous circuits as long as we are using the same semantics
of our dened enumerated data type. The next step is to check whether the glitch
is propagating for our particular glitch injection scenario or not. This is obtained
by performing a reachability analysis. This analysis checks that the invariants at all
the reachable state of the circuit are exhaustively analyzed for glitch propagation to
the primary output. Provided the invariant fails then counterexamples are provided
which we classify as vulnerable sequences to glitch propagation conditions.
27
3.5 Soft Error Analysis on Combinational circuits
In this section, to illustrate the proposed technique, we apply our soft error analysis

























Figure 3.2: C17 with the glitch injected between G2 and G3.
Figure 3.2 shows the implementation of our technique on the ISCAS-85 bench-
mark circuit C17. A glitch is introduced in the circuit using a 2:1 multiplexer at a
potentially vulnerable internal node of the circuit. The glitch is inserted by having
one of the inputs of the multiplexer as a glitch signal and the other input as a normal
signal. Figure 3.2 shows an example implementation with a glitch inserted between
two nand gates, G2 and G3. A register is connected to one of the primary output
where we expect glitch propagation. Then the next step is to perform the invariant
checking, where MDG run reachability analysis and for each reachable state it checks
the invariant on the outputs. The same invariant is used as discussed in Section 3.4.
In case the invariant checking fails our proposed method provides counterexamples.
One such case is shown in Figure 3.3, which shows the counterexample when the
glitch is injected at node C17V2 in Figure 3.2. In our implementation, a critical se-
quence is dened as the sequence of input signals that allow the glitch at an internal
node to propagate to the primary outputs.
In Figure 3.3, it is shown that, starting from the initial state of the output
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=== The Counterexample ===
-------- Assumptions --------
-




-------- Clock cycle 1 --------







-- The symbolic state --
reg_output_signal = dg
-------- Clock cycle 2 --------
-- The symbolic input --
-
-- Symbolic Output --
flag = 1
=== End of counterexample ===
-
Generating counter example took 0.010 seconds.
Figure 3.3: One of the counterexamples for the C17.
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register, the MDG tool provides the symbolic inputs which are the critical sequence
of inputs that allows the glitch on the node C17V2 to propagate to the primary
output. The critical sequence for the previous case is when the input signal c is at
logic '1', signal a at logic '0', and the select signal for the multiplexer is at logic
'1'. The verication time and the time needed to generate the counterexample are
between 10 and 20 millisecond. Table 3.3 shows the critical sequences for all the
internal nodes (C17V1-C17V6). In chapter 5, we propose a full automation of all
these steps.
Figure 3.4: MDG decision diagram for path G1  ! G5 from circuit C17.
Table 3.3: Node wise Vulnerable Conditions for C17.
Internal node Vulnerable Conditions
C17V1 c = 0
C17V2 c = 1, a = 0
C17V3 c = 0
C17V4 a = 0, b = 0
C17V5 e = 0
C17V6 e = 1 , c = 0
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Our method utilized MDG which simplies the use of decision diagram. Pre-
vious approaches utilize dierent techniques for sensitization paths and glitch mod-
eling. One such case is [10] where ADD is used for the glitch modeling and the
BDD checks for the sensitization path. Instead MDG in conjunction with GP sets
allows us to simply dene a truth table, similar to Table 3.1 and 3.2, for each gate in
the circuit that not only depicts sensitization but also encapsulates glitch modeling
information. This is achievable because of enumerated data type of MDG and glitch
propagation modeling approach described in [12]. By modeling the circuit in MDG
using this kind of truth table, we are able to dene both the glitch eect and the
sensitized path using one decision diagram as shown in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4 shows the MDG decision diagram for path G1  ! G5 of the C17
circuit of ISCAS'85 benchmark. In our work, out of one decision diagram we are
able to model the logical masking and model the acceptable amplitude and width
needed by the glitch to propagate. As an example, modeling of the path sensitization
in Figure 3.4. Out G3 and out G5 in Figure 3.4 represent the output of gate 3 and
5 in Figure 3.2. It is shown that when out G3 is equal to 0 then the out G5 will
be 1 irrespective of the glitch value at the other input of G5. To model the glitch
we dened a new data type called glitch type which can be (0, 1, DG, DG'). The
Y signal in Figure 3.4 is an example of a glitch signal.
3.6 Soft Error Analysis on Asynchronous Circuits
As we explained in section 2.2, a digital system with asynchronous interfaces for in-
teraction between synchronous modules is known as a globally asynchronous locally
synchronous (GALS) systems. Several asynchronous interfaces have been proposed
for GALS systems. Broadly, based on their handshake protocol, these interfaces
can be divided into two classes, the bundled data protocol and delay-insensitive
(DI) data-encoded protocol. This section provides glitch propagation analysis for
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Figure 3.5: Hardware implementation of the data-encoded DI scheme.
3.6.1 Delay Insensitive (DI) Asynchronous Circuit
In the Delay-Insensitive design style there is no need for timing analysis, giving
designs that operate correctly regardless of the delay in the interconnecting wires.
1-of-4 data-encoded DI circuit is shown in Figure 3.5. The nx0 -to-nx3 group of
signals is set to high or logic "1" as an initial condition. This group of signals is
represented as nx[0 3] in the rest of this thesis. Similarly, q[0 3] represents the
q0 -to-q3 group of signals, and out[0 3] represents the out0-to-out3 group of signals.
According to the 1-of-N DI data-encoded protocol, of which 1-of-4 is the special case
shown in Figure 3.5, only one of the input lines of in[0 3] can go high at a given
time. When any of these input signals becomes high (to transfer some data), the
corresponding line in the group nx[0 3] is pulled down to logic 0.
The soft error analysis of this kind of the asynchronous circuits is similar to
combinational circuit implementation, we added multiplexer at the internal nodes to
add glitches in asynchronous circuits as well. However, overall, the implementation
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of our technique to asynchronous circuits is more involved. This is mainly due to the
feedback path required for initial conditions to follow the asynchronous protocols.
Figure 3.6 shows the asynchronous delay insensitive (DI) circuit after implementing
the proposed methodology. Here, an initialization mechanism is introduced as a
combination of multiplexers, registers, and decoders. We also needed to break the
feedback path in order to comply with the MDG-tool. In order to keep the func-
tionality of the asynchronous circuit after breaking the feedback path, we added a
combination of multiplexer and register. This addition is to initiate the input part
of the feedback which is the nxa signal in Figure 3.6. By controlling the initial value





























Figure 3.6: Asynchronous Delay Insensitive (DI) circuit after the implementation
3.6.2 Bundled Data Protocol based Asynchronous Circuit
The term bundled-data refers to a situation where the data signals use normal
Boolean levels to encode information, and where separate request and acknowl-
edge wires are bundled with the data signals. Such as the circuit in Figure 3.7.
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Immediately upon activation by a switching event on Den it issues a request for
a clock stretch Ri+ which gets acknowledged by Ai+. When the clock is ensured
to be and remain low, the external handshake cycle on Rp/Ap gets processed and
subsequently the clock may resume again.
By following the same steps applied to the DI circuit, we implemented our
methodology on the bundled-data-protocol based circuit. Figure 3.8 shows the asyn-
chronous bundled data circuit after implementing our methodology. The inputs of
the multiplexer are all the possible input sequences that the input can have based
on the bundle data protocol [29]. After one of the initial sequences is chosen by the
multiplexer, it will be stored in the register. The decoder will give a value for each
input of the circuit based on the chosen initial sequence. BDV1 to BDV8 are the


































Figure 3.8: Asynchronous Bundle Data circuit with the initialization technique.
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3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the proposed methodology for the identication of soft-
errors in both combinational and asynchronous circuits. Also we provided step by
step description of our methodology with examples. We proposed a new technique
for the glitch injection at vulnerable nodes and the breaking and the initializing
of the feedback in asynchronous circuits. We discussed the implementation of our
approach on combinational logic and asynchronous circuits. Later on in this thesis,
we discuss the experimental results of the implementation of this methodology. An
automation of the proposed methodology will be proposed in chapter 5. The goal of
the proposed methodology of this chapter is to model the eect of logical masking
in logic circuits. In the next chapter, we extend this methodology in order to model
the both electrical and logical masking.
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Chapter 4
Identication of Soft Error Glitch
Propagation Path: Considering
Electrical and Logical Masking
In the previous chapter, we explained our methodology to model the eect of log-
ical masking in both combinational and asynchronous circuits. In this chapter, we
explain how the proposed methodology in the previous chapter can be extended
to model the eect of both electrical and logical masking. In Section 4.1, we give
a brief description of electrical masking eect in logic circuits. Assumptions and
notations required to identify the soft error glitch propagation, while considering
electrical masking along with logical masking, are explained in Section 4.2. In Sec-
tion 4.3, these assumptions are used to model the combined eect of electrical and
logical masking utilizing the concept of GP sets. For implementing these modeling
concepts over combinational and asynchronous circuits we proposed a methodology
which is elaborated in Section 4.4.
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4.1 Electrical Masking
As explained in chapter 1, there are three types of masking that can prevent a tran-
sient glitch in combinational logic from propagating to the primary outputs: logical
masking, electrical masking, and latch window or time masking [39, 40]. Logical
masking happens when one of the other inputs of a gate is in controlling state
(e.g., 0 for a NAND gate) so that the transient is blocked. Latch window mask-
ing means that the arrival of the transient pulse is outside of the latching window
for the sequential elements. Electrical masking happens when the voltage transient
resulting from a particle strike is attenuated by subsequent logic gates because of
the electrical property of logic gates [15]. This work primarily deals with the iden-
tication and the verication of soft-error glitch propagation in combinational and
asynchronous circuits, therefore modeling the latching time windows masking eect
is not discussed.
The possibility of glitch propagation in systems, which are subject to logical
and electrical masking, depends on following factors. First the glitch magnitude
at the output, which is a function of the initial amplitude of the glitch and the
attenuation on the sensitized paths and the second factor is the duration of the
glitch. Some notations are dened and a few assumptions are made in order to
accurately model these eects, which are explained in the next section.
4.2 Assumptions and Notations
When the glitch hits the internal nodes, it requires certain threshold amplitude and
duration to charge or discharge the node. Due to electrical masking the amplitude
and the interval of the soft error glitch reduce as it propagates through the design.
Sometimes this reduction in the amplitude and the interval prevents glitch from
reaching the output. Traditionally, electrical simulations are used to understand the
eects of electrical masking. In this work, this information is extracted beforehand
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and utilized at logic level of abstraction. Using the results of electrical simulations
it is safe to conclude that regular FO4 (fan-out of 4) gates may completely mask the
glitch propagation if it is applied to four similar cascaded gates [52]. Keeping this
fact in consideration, following we provide assumptions regarding the glitch charac-
teristics as it propagates through the design to model the electrical masking.
Classication of glitches to facilitate modeling of electrical masking: As a
soft error hits the internal node of the design it can create glitches of dierent ampli-
tude and duration. In order to accommodate dierent levels of possible glitches we
classify them based on the mentioned parameters. It is assumed that the glitch with
the most strength (i.e both the amplitude and duration is well above the threshold
value of the subsequent gates) can pass the complete depth of the combinational
circuit without losing its strength. This type of glitch is given the name G dp4
in our analysis. The glitch with next highest amplitude and duration, which is
subjected to attenuation due to electrical masking, is classied into three further
categories namely G dp3, G dp2, G dp1. The numeric value at the end of each glitch
is attributed to how many gates these glitches may propagate in the worst case. For
simplicity of analysis we further assumed that if G dp3 occurs and passes to the rst
level of gates, the attenuated strength of the glitch can be represented by G dp2.
Similarly G dp1 may represent the occurrence of glitch of strength G dp1 at that
node or attenuated strengths of G dp3 and G dp2 after passing through 2 gates and
1 gate respectively as shown in Figure 4.1. The assumption that the glitch travels
a depth of approximately three gates is inspired by the modeling provided in [52].
Formally the classication of glitches is provided below, and further elaborated in
Figure 4.2.
1. G dp4 : If the amplitude is within (a  a1), and its time duration is within the
interval (4t2 < d < 4t1) as shown in Figure 4.2, then the glitch propagates
through all the cascaded gates without loosing its strength. This is the worst
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case where the glitch has the highest amplitude and duration.
2. G dp3 : If the amplitude is within (a3 < a < a2), and its time duration is
within the interval (4t3 < d < 4t2) as shown in Figure 4.2, then the glitch
propagates through two cascaded gates.
3. G dp2 : If the amplitude is within (a4 < a < a3), and its time duration is
within the interval (4t4 < d < 4t3) as shown in Figure 4.2, then the glitch
propagates through one cascaded gate.
4. G dp1 : If the amplitude is within (0 < a < a4), and its time duration is within
the interval (0 < d < 4t4) as shown in Figure 4.2, then the glitch does not
propagate at all.
Putting Logical and Electrical Masking Together: Figure 4.1 shows the case
when G dp3 amplitude is (a3 < a < a2) and the duration is (4t3 < d < 4t2). This
glitch is injected at the output of gate G1. This glitch now is controlling the next
gate (G2) if and only if the other input of G2 is at logic '1'; otherwise it will be
logically masked as we explained in the previous chapter. As the glitch propagates
through G2, electrical masking reduces the amplitude and the interval and hence































Figure 4.2: A glitch at the (a) output of initial gate G1, (b) output of gate G2, (c)
output of gate G3 on sensitized path.
the input of G2 with level G dp2 assuming that the output G5 is logic '1' then the
glitch characteristics reduction from the propagation through G3 is represented by
moving the glitch from G dp2 to G dp1. In the next sections we combine these
assumptions with the GP sets in order to build the truth table for each logic gate.
4.3 Modeling Electrical and Logical masking
In section 3.2, we used the GP sets to build the truth table for dierent logic gates
and Muller C-element in order to model logical masking. In this section, we extend
this principle to model both electrical and logical masking. Table 4.1 shows the com-
bination of electrical and logical masking by extending the truth tables, which was
previously made for the logical masking only. This table shows the corresponding
output of AND gate for all possible inputs combinations. For example, if the glitch
is injected at one of the inputs of AND gates with level G dp3 then provide the
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other input is at logic '0' the glitch will not be able to propagate to the output due
to logical masking. If the other input is logic '1' one then the glitch will propagates
to the output due to logical masking. Whereas if the non-glitch input is at lo logic
'1' then the glitch on the other input may propagate to the output.
There are two possible transition scenarios with soft error glitch, either the
original signal transits from logic '0' towards '1' or logic '1' towards '0'. It is assumed
that the glitch signals are represented as G dp4, G dp3, G dp2, and G dp1 in the
former case, and they are represented as glitch signals G dp4', G dp3', G dp2' and
G dp1' in the later case. Both cases are included in Table 4.1. For example, if one
of the inputs for the AND gate is logic '1', and the other input is G dp3 or G dp3'
then the output will be G dp2/G dp2'. The same principle is used to build Table
4.2 which shows the corresponding outputs for all the possible inputs combinations
in the case of OR gate.
In order to illustrate this technique, we applied it on the circuit in Figure
4.1. This circuit is a combination of dierent AND gates. As a rst step a glitch
is injected at one of the internal node. Here we injected it at the output of G2
(out G2). Injecting the glitch at the internal node is done using multiplexers as
explained before. Next step is to dene the behaviour for each gate by extracting
the truth table for it from Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: The truth table for AND gate.
0 1 G dp4/G dp4' G dp3/G dp3' G dp2/G dp2' G dp1/G dp1'
0 0 0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
1 0 1 G dp4/ G dp2/ G dp1/ 0/
G dp4' G dp2' G dp1' 1
G dp4/ 0/ G dp4/ G dp4/ G dp4/ G dp4/ G dp4/'
G dp4' 0 G dp4' G dp4' G dp4' G dp4' G dp4'
G dp3/ 0/ G dp2/ G dp4/ G dp2/ G dp2/ G dp2/
G dp3' 0 G dp2' G dp4' G dp2' G dp2' G dp2'
G dp2/ 0/ G dp1/ G dp4/ G dp2/ G dp1/ G dp1/
G dp2' 0 G dp1' G dp4' G dp2' G dp1' G dp1'
G dp1/ 0/ 0/ G dp4/ G dp2/ G dp1/ 1/
G dp1' 0 1 G dp4' G dp2' G dp1' 0
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One of the contributions this work is to propose an easier representation by
modeling both logical and electrical masking in one decision diagram, which is the
multiway decision graph. Figure 4.3 shows the multiway decision graph (MDG) for
the circuit in Figure 4.1 at the output of G3. Signals out G5, out G3 and out G2
present the outputs of G5, G3 and G2 in Figure 4.1 respectively. This decision
graph is similar to what we have in Table 4.1 for the case of AND gates. As shown
in this gure G3 is an AND gate which has two inputs; the rst one is coming from
the output of G5, and the second one is coming from the output of G2. Starting
with out G5 if it is logic 0 then the output of G3 is logic '0' regardless of the value
of out G2 which is the glitch signal. But if out G5 is equal logic '1' then the output
of G3 is dependent on the output of G5. In the last case, the glitch can propagate
to the output of G3 if it has sucient amplitude and duration. Figure 4.3 shows all
the possible cases of out G5, out G2 and the corresponding output of G3 (out G3).
Table 4.2: The truth table for OR gate.
0 1 G dp4/G dp4' G dp3/G dp3' G dp2/G dp2' G dp1/G dp1'
0 0 1 G dp4 G dp2 G dp1 0
/G dp4' /G dp2' /G dp1' /1
1 0 1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1
G dp4 G dp4 1 G dp4 G dp4 G dp4 G dp4
/G dp4' /G dp4' /1 /G dp4' /G dp4' /G dp4' /G dp4'
G dp3 G dp2 1 G dp4 G dp2 G dp2 G dp2
/G dp3' /G dp2' /1 /G dp4' /G dp2' /G dp2' /G dp2'
G dp2 G dp1/ 1 G dp4/ G dp2 G dp1 G dp1
/G dp2' /G dp1' /1 /G dp4' /G dp2' /G dp1' /G dp1'
G dp1 0 1 G dp4 G dp2 G dp1 0


















Figure 4.3: Multiway Decision Graph.
4.4 The Proposed Methodology
This section presents an overview of the proposed technique. Figure 4.4 shows the
ow chart of our methodology for integrating electrical and logical masking. This is
similar to Figure 3.1, with the exception of introduction of the glitch depth block.
Our methodology requires structural specications as input, which is the MDG-
HDL description of the design. The next step is to specify the initial glitch depth to
be injected. This addition is done by dening a new signal type called glitch type
signal. This signal type can take any of the following values: 1, 0, G dp1, G dp2,
G dp3, G dp4. After that the next step is the glitch injection at the vulnerable
nodes of the design by modifying the structural specications. The glitch injection
mechanism is similar to the one adapted in the previous chapter, where multiplexers
are added at the internal nodes. These multiplexers can choose among the normal
mode and the various possible glitch injection values. These glitches are injected for
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any of the desired level, among G dp1 to G dp4, as and when required.
After injecting the design with glitches the next logical step is to identify the
conditions under which the glitches at a particular internal node may propagate to
the primary output. Invariant checking, a formal verication approach, is applied
to examine the possibility of glitch propagation. An invariant, similar to what is
used in Section 3.4, is applied over to perform this verication. It can be written in
temporal logic as:
AG((reg out = 1) _ (reg out = 0))
Which means for all the reachable state in the design the output is always logic '1'
or logic '0'.
In case the glitch can reach the output, which means that both electrical
and logical masking did not prevent the glitch from propagating. In this case our
technique provides the user with a counterexample. The designer can infer the
following from the counterexample:
 The critical sequences, which are the input sequences that allow the glitch to
propagate to the output. With these sequences logical masking alone cannot
prevent the glitch from reaching the output.
 The minimum glitch depth required by the glitch signal at the vulnerable
nodes in order to be able to propagate and reach the primary output.
The ow chart in Figure 4.4 shows that our technique allows the user to verify
the glitch propagation with dierent glitch depths. Start with verifying the glitch
propagation at the rst level (G dp1) then after that verify the glitch propagation












Structural specification of the digital 
system








Glitch depth > Gmax
Yes
No
Figure 4.4: The ow chart for the proposed methodology.
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4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a new methodology to model the combine eect of
electrical and logical masking. We extended the proposed methodology in chapter
3 to model the eect of both masking. We explained the proposed methodology in
detail. We discussed in detail the identication of soft error glitch, we built our own
assumption and notation for the identication of the glitch. Then we dened new
truth tables for each logic gates along with GP sets concepts. The implementation of
this methodology will be explained later in this thesis. In order to make the proposed
methodologies applicable on large design with large number of internal nodes. In
the next chapter we propose a full automation of the proposed methodologies.
Based on our observation we assumed that G dp4 is maximum stages required
glitches to completely attenuated. The number of cascaded gates that the glitch can
propagate through in our work is mainly depending on the following:
 The initial value of the glitch which it is injected at the internal node. For
example, if the glitch is injected with G dp3 then the glitch can propagate
through 2 gates in the propagation path before it reaches to G dp1 as shown
in Figure 4.1. If the glitch at level G dp2 then maximum it can propagate
through 1 gates before it reaches to G dp1.
 As an initial assumption, we assumed that all the gates have the same size.
Dierent behaviour for each gate is possible by creating dierent truth tables




Identication of Soft Error
Glitch-Propagating Paths(SEGP)
In this chapter, we proposes a new tool, soft error glitch-propagating path nder
SEGP-Finder to identify the propagation of soft error at gate level. SEGP-Finder
models electrical and logical masking eects and verify the glitch propagation by
implementing previous proposed methodology. The applicability of the tool over
combinational and asynchronous circuits is illustrated by implementing 8-bit adders,
multipliers, and the Self-timed multiple-group pipeline asynchronous handshake cir-
cuits.
5.1 Identication of Soft-Error at Gate-Level
In order to explain the automation of the proposed technique, we are providing
usage of the les that are required by MDG. Our automation tool (described in next
section) modies these les; therefore this information is helpful in understanding
the contextual details:
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 The algebraic specication le denes sorts, function types and generic con-
stants used in hardware descriptions. In our work, this le contains the deni-
tion of the glitch sort signal, where 0, 1, DG, DGP are the possible values for
this signal in the design when logical masking is only modeled. G dp1, G dp2,
G dp3, G dp4 are the possible values in case of modeling both electrical and
logical masking.
 The symbol order le provides the custom (user-dened) symbol order for all
the variables and cross-operators which would appear in MDG model.
 The circuit description le declares signals and their sort assignments, com-
ponent network, outputs and the mapping between state variables and next
state variables.
 The invariant specication le denes the invariant to be checked during the
reachability analysis. E.g. the invariant (written in temporal logic)AG((reg out =
0)jj(reg out = 1)) means "In all the reachable states, the output of the register
is equal to 1 or 0".
5.2 SEGP-Finder
This section explains the features of the proposed tool (SEGP-Finder). This tool
implements the methodology in the previous chapter. Flow chart of SEGP-Finder is
shown in Figure 5.1. It illustrates that the input of our tool is the Gate-level MDG-
HDL model of the design combined with the GP sets and the glitch identication.
There are four main stages shown in Figure 5.1. The rst one is to annotate the
MDG Model where modications are applied on the design le to accommodate
possible soft error glitches at the vulnerable nodes. Output of the annotated MDG
Model is given to the invariant generator, which provides the MDG-invariant. Next
is the MDG verication step where we perform the invariant checking in MDG.
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Finally, SEGP-Finder analyzes the results and generates result le. The following











Figure 5.1: The ow chart of the SEGP-Finder.
5.3 Annotate the MDG Model
Annotating the eects of soft error glitches in the design is implemented by anno-
tator, shown in Figure 5.2. As the name suggests, annotator prepares the design
written in MDG-HDL to perform verication. The goal here is to modify the MDG-
HDL model of the design to accommodate soft error glitches. This is done by
modifying the MDG input les as explained in Section 2 and graphically shown in
Figure 5.2.
Next step is to inject the glitch for each internal node. It shows that for
each new description le annotator injects the glitch at one internal node. This is
a recursive process done for all the internal nodes. As an example, for "Spec 1"




Inv. file Alg. file
Annotator
Pr_scNPr_sc2Pr_sc1
Alg. fileInv. file Order file Spec. file
Figure 5.2: The annotator.
multiplexer (mux) component to the design in "Spec 1". This introduction of mux
component is made possible by modifying the subsequent connecting gates. To il-
lustrate fully the working algorithm, consider the small circuit example in Figure
5.3 (ISCAS-85 benchmark circuit C17 with glitch inserted at N1). To perform this
glitch injection at N1, the annotator opens the "Spec 1" and adds a mux component
to the design at N1 which, in MDG-HDL, is the following:
component(mux, mux( sel(select) ,inputs([(0,N1), (1,y)]) , output(n select init))).
In MDG every signal in the design is sequentially arranged in the order le
which is the representation format of net-list in MDG. The signals related to the
new mux component need to be inserted in the order le. The annotator creates a
copy of the original order le. Next it opens the new order le and adds these new
glitch signals to the order list of the design.
In order to run the MDG to do our verication one time the user has to guide
or interact with MDG nine times. It is very hard to do this for large design with
large number of internal nodes. In this tool we handle this issue by writing a prolog
script for each glitch verication case. The number of these scripts is equal to the
number of the internal nodes. These scripts are automatically generated without


























Figure 5.3: C17 with the glitch injected between G1and G5.
5.4 MDG Invocation and Result Organization
The proposed approach includes running all the prolog scripts in sequence. This
can be done by writing a shell script. This script is generated automatically by
the annotator and it performs two main functions. The rst function is to run all
the prolog scripts as shown in the top box of Figure 5.4. In the second step MDG
verication results for all the iterations are stored into separate les. Therefore the
number of result les is equal to the number of the internal nodes. Afterwards, as
shown in Figure 5.4, an analysis is run on these result les. Here the tool extracts
the critical sequence, the counterexamples, along with verication time information
from each result le. Next section further discusses these results.
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RESULT         ANALYSIS 












Figure 5.4: User Transparent MDG Invocation and Result Analysis.
5.5 Experimental Results
We performed our verication using a SUN RAY2 computer, with the SUSE Linux
Enterprise Server 10 operating system, over an Intel core i7-860 processor.
5.5.1 Implementation
Logical Masking
For the Combinational circuits starting with the C17 circuit, for each design we
injected glitches at every internal node of the circuit and invariant checking is per-


























Figure 5.5: C17 with the glitch injected between G1 and G5.
=== The Counterexample ===
-------- Assumptions --------
-
-------- Initial state --------
reg_output_signal = 1
-------- Clock cycle 1 --------




-- The symbolic state --
reg_output_signal = dg
-------- Clock cycle 2 --------
-- The symbolic input --
-
-- Symbolic Output --
flag = 1
=== End of counterexample ===
Generating counter example took 0.010 seconds.
Figure 5.6: One of the counterexamples for the C17.
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As we explained before, our proposed method provides counterexamples in
case the invariant checking fails. One such case is shown in Figure 5.6, which shows
the counterexample when the glitch is injected at node C17V1 in Figure 5.3. In
Figure 5.6, it is shown that, starting from the initial state of the output register,
the MDG tool provides the symbolic inputs which are the critical sequence of inputs
that allows the glitch on the node C17V1 to propagate to the primary output. The
critical sequence for the previous case is when the input signal c is at logic '0' and
the select signal for the multiplexer is at logic '1'. The verication time and the
time needed to generate the counterexample are between 10 and 20 millisecond.
SEGPnder collects all the counterexamples for the target circuit and provide the
user back with table that includes all the results such as Table 5.1 for the C17
circuit. Table 5.1 shows the critical sequences of all the internal nodes of the C17
circuit (C17V1-C17V6) .
Table 5.1: Node wise vulnerable conditions for C17.
Internal node Vulnerable Conditions
C17V1 c = 0
C17V2 c = 1, a = 0
C17V3 c = 0
C17V4 a = 0, b = 0
C17V5 e = 0
C17V6 e = 1 , c = 0
The second example on the combinational circuit implementation is the 4-bit
adder which is shown in 5.7. By giving the MDG model of the 4-bit adder as input
to our tool Table 5.2 is the output. This table shows the corresponding critical
sequence or vulnerable condition for each internal node. a0 = 0, b0 = 0, select =
1, glitch signal = dg is the critical sequence when the glitch is injected at node N2
in Figure 5.7. Based on the result shown in Table 5.2 logical masking eect alone




























Figure 5.7: Gate-Level representation of 4-bit adder circuit.
the modeling of the electrical masking eect in this circuit, then we verify if both
masking eects can prevent the glitch propagation.
Table 5.2: Node wise vulnerable conditions for 4-Bit adder circuit.
Node name Verication Vulnerable Condition
time (sec.)
N1 0.37 select = 1, glitch signal = dg, cin0= 0.
N2 0.34 select = 1, glitch signal = dg, a0 = 0, b0=0.
N3 0.34 select = 1, glitch signal = dgp, cin0= 0.
N4 0.34 select = 1, glitch signal = dgp, a1 = 0, b1 = 0.
N5 0.33 select = 1, glitch signal = dg, cin1 = 0.
N6 0.33 select = 1, glitch signal = dgp, a1 =0, b1 =1.
N7 0.33 select = 1, glitch signal = dg, cin1= 0.
N8 0.36 select = 1, glitch signal = dg, a2 = 0, b2=0.
N9 0.34 select = 1, glitch signal = dg, cin2= 0.
N10 0.36 select = 1, glitch signal = dgp, a2 = 0, b2 =1.
N11 0.37 select = 1, glitch signal = dg, a2= 0, b2=0.
N12 0.39 select = 1, glitch signal = dg, a3 = 0, b3 = 0.
N13 0.38 select = 1, glitch signal = dgp,cin3 = 0.
N14 0.37 select = 1, glitch signal = dgp,a3 = 0, b3 = 0.
N15 0.37 select = 1, glitch signal = dgp,cin3= 0.
N16 0.35 select = 1, glitch signal = dgp,cin3= 1,a3=0, b3=1.
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For asynchronous circuits, we not only have to consider the input values but
also the order in which signals get asserted. For example, according to the 1-of-N
DI data-encoded protocol, of which 1-of-4 is the special case shown in Figure 3.6,
only one of the input lines can go high at a given time. When any of these input
signals becomes high (to transfer some data), the corresponding line in the signal
group nx[0-3] is pulled down to logic "0". Based on this protocol, the possible
input sequences (Z0-Z3) are obtained. We call these possible input sequences initial
input sequences of the multiplexer in Figure 3.6. Based on the chosen initial input
sequence from the multiplexer, the decoder gives certain values for each input of the
circuit. To ease reading, we have provided these initial sequences in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: The initial sequences for the DI circuit.
Initial sequence
The input value
q0 q1 q2 q3 nxa out ack
Z0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Z1 0 1 0 0 1 0
Z2 0 0 0 0 0 1
Z3 0 0 0 0 1 0
Table 5.4 shows the critical sequence for all the internal nodes for the DI circuit
under all the possible input sequences. The previous state output of the C-element
X is represented by t IsX. Select2 is the selection signal of the multiplexer at the
internal node. Table 5.4 shows that the glitches at internal node can propagate
under all the possible input sequences if the previous value of the output C-element
is logic '1'.
The vulnerable nodes for the bundle data circuit in Figure 3.8 are identied
as BDV1 to BDV8. For the introduction of glitches at each node, there is a specic
critical sequence for the glitch to propagate. Such as, introducing glitch at BDV1
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Table 5.4: Node wise vulnerable conditions for DI asynchronous circuit.
Internal Node Initial sequences Vulnerable Conditions
Nx0 Z0 t ls5 = 0, glitch signal = dgp, select2 = 1.
Nx0 Z1 t ls5 = 1, glitch signal = dg, select2 = 1.
Nx0 Z2 t ls5 = 1, glitch signal = dg, select2 = 1.
Nx0 Z3 t ls5 = 1, glitch signal = dg. select2 = 1.
Nx1 Z0 t ls6 = 0, glitch signal = dgp select2 = 1.
Nx1 Z1 t ls6 = 1, glitch signal = dg select2 = 1.
Nx1 Z2 t ls6 = 1, glitch signal = dg, select2 = 1.
Nx1 Z3 t ls6 = 1, glitch signal = dgp select2 = 1.
Nx2 Z0 t ls7 = 0, glitch signal = dgp select2 = 1.
Nx2 Z1 t ls7 = 1, glitch signal = dg select2 = 1.
Nx2 Z2 t ls7 = 1, glitch signal = dgp select2 = 1.
Nx2 Z3 t ls7 = 1, glitch signal = dg select2 = 1.
Nx3 Z0 t ls8 = 0, glitch signal = dgp select2 = 1.
Nx3 Z1 t ls8 = 1, glitch signal = dg select2 = 1.
Nx3 Z2 t ls8 = 1, glitch signal = dgp select2 = 1.
Nx3 Z3 t ls8 = 1, glitch signal = dg select2 = 1.
in Figure 3.8, then the counterexample shows that the critical sequence is Reset=1,
Z0=1, Ai=1 or Reset=1, Z0=1, Rp=1. We applied our MDG model and performed
our verication methodology for all the identied vulnerable nodes of the circuit
and a log of critical sequences was taken. We obtained a table similar to Tables 5.1
and 5.4 for bundled data protocol as well, but because of space limitation, we did
not put it here.
Figure 5.8 shows the self-timed multiple-group pipeline circuit [48] to be veried
using our technique. In order to verify the glitch propagation for this asynchronous
circuit we started with verifying the completion detection part which is shown in
Figure 5.9. A gate level representation of the 3-of-6 completion detection is shown in
Figure 5.9. We injected the glitch at the inputs of the completion detections shown
in Figure 5.9. Table 5.5 shows partial results of this design when the initial values
of all primary inputs are zero.
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Figure 5.9: 3-of-6 completion detection.
Electrical Masking
In our tool SEGP-Finder we implemented the proposed methodology which we dis-
cussed in chapter 4, in order to model the electrical masking. Here we show our tool
results for modeling electrical masking on dierent combinational and asynchronous
circuits. Starting with the 4-bit adder circuit shown in Figure 5.10. A gate level
representation of the 4-bit adder is shown in Figure 5.7. As we explained earlier the
4-bit adder consists of multiple full adder blocks. So one ecient way to verify this
design is to verify one of the full adders. We injected the glitch at one internal node
of the full adder circuit then we veried the glitch propagation for all the outputs.
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Table 5.5: Node wise vulnerable conditions for the self-timed multiple-group pipeline
circuit.
Node name Verication Vulnerable Condition
time (sec.)
D0 0.70 select=1,glitch signal=dg,feed1=0,in1=0,
in3=0,in4=0,in5= 0,t ls1=1,t ls2=0,t ls3=1
D1 0.73 select=1,glitch signal=dg,feed1=0,in2=0,
in3=0,in1=0,in5=0,t ls1=1,t ls2=0,t ls3= 1.
D2 0.73 select=1,glitch signal=dg,feed1=0,in1=0,
in2= 0,in4=0,in5=0,t ls1=1,t ls2=0,t ls3=1.
D3 0.74 select=1,glitch signal=dg,feed1=0,in1= 0,
in2 = 0,in3=0,in5 = 0,t ls1 = 1,t ls2 = 0,t ls3 = 1.
D4 0.75 select =1, glitch signal=dg, feed1=0,in1=0,
,in2 =0,in3=0,in4=0,in6=1,t ls9=1,t ls2=0,t ls3 = 1.
D5 0.70 select=1,glitch signal=dgp,feed1=0,in1=0,in2=0,
in3=0,in4=0,in5=1,t ls8 = 1,t ls2 =0,t ls3= 1.
Out of the results shown in Table 5.6, we are able to nd that the glitch can
propagate from the full adder where it is injected to the next full adder based on the
glitch assumption we have. By keeping the glitch in the same position as before (at
node N1) and checking the carry of the second full adder in Figure 5.10 we noticed
that the invariant checking a success which means that the glitch cannot reach that
point due to the electrical masking. Because the 4-bit adder is a combination of full
Table 5.6: The result when a glitch the glitch inserted at the output of N1.
primary Glitch depth Vulnerable Conditions
output at the output
S0 G dp2 select = 1, glitch signal = G dp3, cin0 = 0.
C0 G dp1 select = 1, glitch signal = G dp3,
cin0 = 1, a0 = 1,b0 = 0.
S1 G dp1 select = 1, glitch signal = G dp3,























Figure 5.10: 4-bit adder circuit.
adder blocks we do not need to verify the glitch propagation for all the full adders.
Verifying one block saves time and reduces complexity.
Figure 5.11: 4-bit multiplier circuit.
A combinational multiplier is a good example for showing how our technique
can be used to verify electrical masking because we have sucient depth. The 4-bit
multiplier circuit is shown in 5.11. The scheme that is shown in Figure 5.11 is often
referred to as ripple carry since each more signicant column in the sum must wait
for the carries to be computed in the less signicant columns before its corresponding
sum bit can be computed.
In the gure above the two bits to be added enter from the top, any carry in
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from the right enters from the right, and any carry out exits from the left of each
block. The output from the bottom of a block is the sum. The least signicant
output bit, S0 (the rst column), involves only two input bits and is computed as
the simple output of an AND gate. This operation cannot generate a carry out.
The next output bit, S1, involves the sum of two partial products. A half adder is
used to form the sum since there can be no carry in from the rst column; however,
a carry out can be produced. The third output bit, S2, is formed from the sum of
three (1-bit) partial products plus a possible carry in from the previous bit. This
operation requires two cascaded adders (one half adder and one full adder) to sum
the four possible input bits (three partial products and one possible carry in from the
right). The remaining output bits are formed similarly. Because in some columns
we must add more than two binary numbers, there may be more than one carry out
generated to the left. Similar to the 4-bit adder, we injected the glitch with dierent
depth and for all the internal nodes.
5.5.2 Discussion
In this section, a comparison is provided between our proposed soft-error estimation
technique and other contemporary techniques. Conventionally, the total number of
tested input sequences for the glitch propagation can be found using the following
formula:
f(x; y) = 2x  y (5.1)
Where x is the number of primary input and y is the number of internal nodes
(vulnerable nodes). For example, the total number of tested input sequences for the
C17 is 192 because it has 5 input and 6 internal nodes. Our methodology allows
the designer to determine the smallest set of input sequences that are responsible
for soft-error glitch propagation. Table 5.8 illustrates this fact; as it can be seen,
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the required number of the inputs to the sequence to be veried is reduced in all
the cases. For example, for the C17, instead of verifying the circuit for 192 input
sequences, using our technique, we need to verify the circuit under only 6 sequences.
The results shown in all the tables in this section can be provided to the designers to
analyze and possibly avoid the soft error glitch propagation using logic design and
circuit techniques. These results are also benecial to DFT groups so that it can
be made sure that these logic paths have ample controllable and observable points.
This information can help a protocol developer to refrain from using the vulnerable
paths as much as possible. Another advantage of our tool is the possibility of
applying partially instead of doing it for all the internal nodes. It helps a designer
in investigating only part of the design; partial verication is of course time ecient.
The fact that SEGP-Finder has been successfully applied to relatively large circuits
proves the scalability of the technique.
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Table 5.7: Node wise vulnerable conditions for 4-Bit adder circuit.
Node name Verication Vulnerable Condition
time (sec.)
N1 0.37 select = 1, glitch signal = G dp3,
cin0= 0.
N2 0.34 select = 1, glitch signal = G dp3,
a0 = 0, b1 = 0.
N3 0.34 select = 1, glitch signal = G dp3,
cin0 = 0.
N4 0.34 select = 1, glitch signal = G dp3,
a1 = 0, b1 = 0.
N5 0.33 select = 1, glitch signal = G dp3,
cin1 = 0.
N6 0.33 select = 1, glitch signal = G dp3,
a1 = 0, b1 = 1.
N7 0.33 select = 1, glitch signal = G dp3,
cin1 = 0.
N8 0.36 select = 1, glitch signal = G dp3,
a2 = 0, b2 = 0.
N9 0.34 select = 1, glitch signal = G dp3,
cin2 = 0.
N10 0.36 select = 1, glitch signal = G dp3,
a2 = 0, b2 = 1.
N11 0.37 select = 1, glitch signal = G dp3,
a2 = 0, b2 = 0.
N12 0.39 select = 1, glitch signal = G dp3,
a3 = 0, b3 = 0.
N13 0.38 select = 1, glitch signal = G dp3,
cin3 = 0.
N14 0.37 select = 1, glitch signal = G dp3,
a3 = 0, b3 = 0.
N15 0.37 select = 1,glitch signal = G dp3,
cin3= 0.
N16 0.35 select = 1, glitch signal = G dp3,
cin3 = 1,a3 = 0, b3 = 0.
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Table 5.8: Identiable vulnerable input sequences.
Number of




internal nodes inputs time
C17 6 192 6 3.125 1.8
4-bit adder 20 5120 20 0.39 6.2
DI 4 256 16 6.25 5.6
Bundle data 8 1024 80 7.8125 28
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5.6 Summary
In this chapter, SEGP-Finder has been proposed, which is a new tool to identify
the propagation soft error glitch at gate level. We explained how SEGP-Finder
models electrical and logical masking eects and verify the glitch propagation by
implementing previous proposed methodology. SEGP-Finder has been tested over
many combinational and asynchronous circuits. Considerably large designs, such
as adders and multipliers, have been implemented with little intervention require-
ment, emphasizes the eciency and scalability of this tool. It is shown that the
counter-examples, generated from this methodology, can be exploited at various de-
sign abstraction levels. Based on the results indicate that SEGP-Finder is fast and
accurate compared with simulation based techniques. The overall verication time
is linearly related to the number of internal nodes.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
We proposed a novel method to identify paths that can propagate soft faults and
glitches in both combinational and asynchronous circuits. This technique provides
the critical sequence of inputs for both combinational and asynchronous circuits at
an early stage of the design cycle. It helps designers applying radiation tolerance
techniques on limited parts of data paths. The proposed technique also considerably
reduces the number of required fault injection vectors. Only 7.8 % and 6.25 % of
the total input sequences need to be injected to characterize the complex bundled
data protocol based and 1-of-4 DI based asynchronous circuits, respectively.
A methodology for automating the Identication of paths propagating soft
faults and glitches is presented. The proposed automation tool, SEGP-Finder has
been tested over many combinational and asynchronous circuits. Fair size designs,
such as an 8-bit adder and the 4-bit multiplier, have been analyzed with little human
intervention, which is a promising result with respect to the eciency and scalability
of this tool. It is shown that the counterexamples, generated with this methodology,
can be exploited at various design abstraction levels.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the very rst time multiway decision
graphs have been used to model, analyze, and verify glitch related behaviour of
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digital circuits. The proposed technique oers many benets. It provides the de-
signer information about what to expect in case of a soft error occurrence in the
circuit. Based on this information, the designer may alter the design, insert mitiga-
tion mechanisms at particular nodes rather than introducing complete redundancy
(as is the case with triple module redundancy TMR), or simply avoid vulnerable
design scenarios.
The proposed methodology and tool cannot handle sequential circuits at this
time. So in order to make it more general, we plan to extend it in the future to
include sequential circuits. Also this work does not contain timing analysis since
our verication core is the MDG does not support timing analysis. Therefore, latch
window masking was not modeled in this work, because modeling this masking eect
requires knowledge of the glitch arrival time window. Extending the work in this
thesis can be done along dierent paths, such as extending the methodology to
sequential circuits. This can be done by proposing a new technique to model the
SR-Latches components and other sequential component.
Building on our work, soft error analysis at higher abstraction levels can also
be performed. Starting from the gate level soft error analysis for some of the most
commonly used combinational blocks in digital design, new GP sets for bigger blocks
can be dened, then, from these GP sets, we can build new truth tables to dene
the behaviour for the combinational blocks. After that, a library containing the soft
error dened behaviour for all basic combinational blocks can be built and used for
soft error analysis.
In order to explain our last idea, a 4-bit adder circuit which is shown in Figure
5.10 can be constructed from a number of 1-bit full adders, so instead of verifying
the soft error propagation for the whole design at the gate level. We can use the
proposed methodology to verify glitch propagation for a 1-bit full adder at the gate
level. Out of this verication, we can extract the GP sets for this circuit. Then the
next step would be to build the a truth table dening the behaviour of this circuit
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based on the extracted GP sets. The last step is to store the new dened behaviour
in our library. In the future if we want to verify 4-bit or 8-bit adders or an adder
of any size , what we need to do is just to call the 1-bit full adder models from the
library and connect them and then the verication can be performed at the RTL
level. The same approach can be applied to other circuits such as multipliers.
Finally, we believe this thesis is an important milestone towards building a
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